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NOTE
COURTS MISTAKENLY CROSS-OUT
MEMORIALS: WHY THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE IS NOT VIOLATED BY ROADSIDE
CROSSES
I.

INTRODUCTION

Mollie Mishoe lost her husband in a fatal car accident on August 3,
2007, a few months before their fiftieth wedding anniversary.' For
Mollie and her children, the grieving process included erecting two
roadside crosses at the site of the accident, to memorialize their beloved
husband and father, Bill Mishoe. 2 This location was the last spot Bill
was alive, and the cross memorial is a place the family goes to remember
and feel close to him again. The Mishoes have become spiritually
connected to the site of the accident, and to the cross memorial they have
placed there.4 This is the place where they can still feel Bill's
presence-a place where they can heal. 5 For them, this memorial has
become "sacred[,] but not necessarily religious." 6
The Mishoes have maintained this memorial for three and a half
years, "trim[ming] the weeds around the crosses, and chang[ing] out the
wreath and flowers on them." 7 In February 2011, the Mishoes learned
1. See Teresa Stepzinski, GeorgiaDOT Says Roadside Memorials to Accident Victims Must
Go, FLA. TIMES UNION (Feb. 10, 2011, 11:21 AM), http://jacksonville.com/news/crime/2011-0210/story/georgia-dot-says-roadside-memorials-accident-victims-must-go.
2. Id.
3. Id.; see also Ian Urbina, As Roadside Memorials Multiply, a Second Look, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 6, 2006, at Al (explaining that a mother visits her daughter's roadside memorial weekly
because it "is where [her] . . . spirit was last").

4. See JoAnne Klimovich Harrop, Roadside shrines help loved ones deal with tragedy,
PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV. (July 4, 2010), http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/valleyindependent/news/
s_688762.html.
5. See id; Stepzinski, supranote 1.
6. See Sylvia Grider, It's Futile to Ban Them, Comment to Should Roadside Memorials Be
Banned?, ROOM FOR DEBATE (July 12, 2009, 7:00 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/
2009/07/12/should-roadside-memorials-be-banned/.
7. Stepzinski, supra note 1.
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that their cross memorial is in danger of being removed.8 The Georgia
Department of Transportation plans to remove all current roadside
memorials, and replace them with a temporary oval sign that will remain
standing for one year.9 In an instant, the Mishoes will lose that sacred
place where they go to grieve the loss of their loved one.'o
Many families all over the world face the same problem. These
families erect a cross in memory of a deceased loved one, and upon
visiting it one day, learn that the government or another private party has
dismantled it. In the United States, roadside cross memorials usually
face removal by the government because they are deemed to violate the
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution." Even though these crosses
are created and maintained by a private party, not by the government,
they are removed because some believe their existence is a sign that the
federal government is endorsing the Christian religion.12
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."l 3 This rule,
known as the Establishment Clause, causes much confusion when
applied to religious symbols erected on public property.1 4 The U.S.
Supreme Court has issued a definitive ruling that any monument erected
on public land constitutes government speech, even if there is private
funding for the monument.'" This subjects all privately donated
monuments erected on public land to scrutiny under the Establishment
Clause. 16
The courts have had a difficult time articulating when a religious
symbol erected on public land violates the Establishment Clause.' 7 This
is because Establishment Clause jurisprudence is controlled by the
slightest differences in each case, leading to a fact-specific inquiry.' 8
This has resulted in the use of a variety of tests in evaluating
Establishment Clause challenges, yet the U.S. Supreme Court has never

8. Id.
9. Id
10. See id.
11. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1164 (10th Cir. 2010).
12. Seeid.atil60.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
14. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 146-47, 220 (Univ. N.C. Press, 2d ed., rev. 1994) (1986) (stating that the Framers had
different views of the meaning of the Establishment Clause and the court has been inconsistent in its
interpretation).
15. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1138 (2009).
16. Id.
17. See LEVY, supra note 14, at 220-21.
18. See Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 156 (5th Cir. 1991).
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held one of these tests to be the definitive rule of law. 19 In a recent case,
American Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan,2 0 the Tenth Circuit held that crosses
erected along a highway in memory of fallen highway patrol officers
violated the Establishment Clause because a reasonable observer could
view these crosses as endorsing the Christian religion. 2 1 Even though
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is inconsistent, this Note examines
why crosses, when used specifically as roadside memorials, do not
violate the Establishment Clause.
Part II of this Note provides a brief overview of the history of the
Establishment Clause, highlighting why it is difficult for the courts to
interpret this rule. Part III examines the tests applied in previous
Establishment Clause cases. Part IV discusses the overall approach the
courts have taken towards public displays of crosses in general. Part V
discusses why crosses, when used as roadside memorials, do not violate
the Establishment Clause. Part VI proposes the adoption of a bright line
test that crosses, only when used as roadside memorials, do not violate
the Establishment Clause.
II.

THE AMBIGUITY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

The courts have struggled with how to interpret the Establishment
Clause. 22 This is because the language of the First Amendment is broad
and the Framers of the Constitution "never stated in a clear and
unanimous voice their precise intention behind" it. 23 The legislative
history surrounding this rule is scarce and does not explain the Framers'
purpose behind the existence of this rule. 24 Most of the recorded debates
that occurred during the drafting of the Establishment Clause state that
different people had different intentions for this rule; there was no unity
behind what goal this rule was intended to accomplish.2 5
The House had a special committee that analyzed the proposed
amendments to the Constitution.26 The report this committee submitted
to the House suggested that the original language of the Establishment

19. See LEVY, supra note 14, at 221-22 (finding that the court has been "erratic and
unprincipled in its decisions" and uses many different tests to analyze Establishment Clause
violations).
20. 616 F.3d I145 (10th Cir. 2010).
21. Id at 1160.
22. See LEVY, supra note 14, at 220.
23. See PATRICK M. GARRY, WRESTLING WITH GOD: THE COURTS' TORTUOUS TREATMENT
OF RELIGION 88 (2006).
24. See LEVY, supra note 14, at 96, 105.
25. See GARRY, supra note 23, at 88; LEVY, supranote 14, at 96-99.
26. LEVY, supra note 14, at 96.
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Clause be redrafted.2 7 The amendment proposed by James Madison to
this committee first stated "nor shall any national religion be
established." 28 The committee suggested the removal of the word
"national," but failed to provide an explanation for this change. 29
Furthermore, to add to the confusion surrounding this rule, the debate of
the House on the amendment took only one day,30 and "[a]mbiguity,
brevity, and imprecision .. . characterize the comments of the few
members who spoke."
The only slight piece of insight into whether the interpretation of
the Establishment Clause should be narrow or broad are the events that
took place during the drafting of the amendment.32 The Senate drafted a
narrower version that would only forbid the establishment of a single
national church.33 However, the House rejected this version, favoring
the broadly constructed current version.34 To persuade the House to
compromise with it on the wording of several other amendments, the
Senate agreed to the broader formulation.35 While this piece of history
may provide a look into the thoughts of the Framers in enacting the
Establishment Clause, it does not provide us with clear evidence that the
intent was for a broad interpretation. 3 6 All that can be inferred from this
information is that the House rejected a very narrow interpretation of
this Clause and that the Senate acquiesced to the demand in exchange for
getting its way in regard to other amendments.37 This ambiguity in the
formation of the Establishment Clause leads to much confusion in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 8
III.

TESTS USED FOR ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CHALLENGES

The U.S. Supreme Court has decided a multitude of cases
concerning challenges to the Establishment Clause. The Court has
utilized various tests in analyzing these challenges. 3 9 However, it has
never declared any of these to be the definitive test that would govern
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id. at 94-95.
Id. at 96.
See IANNALS OF CONG. 757-59 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
LEVY, supra note 14, at99.
See id. at 102-04.
See id. at 102-03.
See id. at 103-04.
See S. Journal, Ist Cong., Ist Sess. 87 (1789); LEVY, supra note 14, at 104.
See LEVY, supra note 14, at 105.
See id at 104.
See id.at 105.
See id. at 220-21.
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every Establishment Clause challenge. 40 The following is a description
of some of the tests the Court has applied.
A.

The Lemon Test

In Lemon v. Kurtzman,4 1 the U.S. Supreme Court examined statutes
enacted in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island that allowed these states to
provide aid to nonpublic schools, the majority of which were Catholic
schools.42 In deciding this challenge to the Establishment Clause, the
Court laid out a test to be used for claims of Establishment Clause
violations involving statutes. 43 The statute at issue "must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... [and third, it] must not
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."'" This
test grew out of the theory that "the establishment clause [sic] existed to
create a secular state and that under the First Amendment nonreligion
was just as important as religion." 4 5 While this may have been the first
attempt at defining a controlling test for determining Establishment
Clause violations, the Court has never held it to be the decisive test for
46
all Establishment Clause cases. Rather, these factors are seen by the
Court as "'no more than helpful signposts."' 47

40. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, What is the Matter with Equality?: An Assessment of the
Equal Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in FirstAmendment Jurisprudence,75 IND. L.J. 193,
194 (2000) ("There is no underlying theory of religious freedom that has captured a majority of the
Court, and the Court's commitment to its announced doctrines is tenuous at best.").
41. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
42. Id. at 607-10.
43. See id. at 612-13.
44. Id (citation omitted).
45. GARRY, supranote 23, at 52.
46. The Court has often looked to other tests to aid in deciding if a violation of the
Establishment Clause exists. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (declining to
use the Lemon test because looking at the history of the monument would be more helpful in that
situation); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) (choosing to use a Neutrality test
as opposed to the Lemon test in determining if aid to nonpublic schools violated the Establishment
Clause); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786, 792 (1983) (finding it was constitutional to allow a
chaplain to open legislative sessions with a prayer despite the fact that the Court of Appeals
determined that this action would be unconstitutional if evaluated under Lemon).
47. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686 (citation omitted) (stating that the Lemon test is not helpful
enough in analyzing Establishment Clause cases).
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B. Justice O'Connor's "EndorsementTest"
In Lynch v. Donnelly,48 the Court examined a Christmas display
composed of not only various secular items but also a crbche. 4 9 In her
concurrence, Justice O'Connor expanded the meaning of the Lemon test
into what is now known as the Endorsement test. 50 She suggested that in
using the purpose and effect prongs, the Court must look at the message
the government intends to communicate as well as the message actually
communicated.5 1 This dual examination is critical because the message
perceived by the audience is not always the intended message.52 Thus,
the "proper inquiry . .. is whether the government intends to convey a
message of endorsement or disapproval of religion[,]" 53 in addition to
whether any "[e]ndorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community." 54
Justice O'Connor stated in her Lynch concurrence that the Court
must concentrate on the objective message perceived by the
community.55 However, at that time, she did not discuss how to judge
this perceived message, leaving only a vague description of the
Endorsement test that required analyzing how the community, the
possible outsiders, would view the action at issue. 56
In Wallace v. Jaffree,57 Justice O'Connor expanded this notion,
stating that "[t]he relevant issue is whether an objective observer,
acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the
statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement, 58 Facing criticism
over what amount of knowledge a reasonable observer should have
regarding the display, this concept has evolved, and the display is now
analyzed from the viewpoint of a "reasonable, informed observer."59

48. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
49. Id at 671. A crbche is a nativity scene usually composed of "the Infant Jesus, Mary and
Joseph, angels, shepherds, kings, and animals." Id.
50. See id at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 690.
52. See id.
53. Id at 691.
54. Id at 688.
55. See id. at 690.
56. See Kristi L. Bowman, Seeing Government Purpose Through the Objective Observer's
Eyes: The Evolution-IntelligentDesign Debates, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 417,446 (2006).
57. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
58. Id. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
59. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 773 (1995) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
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The reasonable observer is not a bystander, casually passing by the
display one day. 60 Rather, the reasonable observer is aware of the
religious display's essential history, its context, and its location. 6 ' The
reasonable observer is also aware of who owns the land on which the
display rests. 62 This observer is a rational being who will consider his or
her knowledge of the display before rendering a neutral decision on
whether the display violates the Establishment Clause in the context in
which it is being used.63 The reason for this is that anyone could
possibly perceive any display to endorse religion if he or she does not
know the reason it was erected. 4 This would create a broad,
overreaching analysis of the Establishment Clause and would "require
[the] invalidation of a government practice merely because it in fact
causes ... advancement or inhibition of religion."65 Requiring the
reasonable observer to be informed to some extent strikes a balance
between an interpretation of the Establishment Clause that is either too
narrow or too broad.66
There are, however, some pitfalls to the Endorsement test. The
courts have had differing opinions with regard to religious displays,
basing their decisions on factors such as the religious symbol's
location67 or whether it is surrounded by secular symbols. 6 8 Different
facts result in different conclusions.69 Furthermore, the Endorsement test
60. See id. at 780-81.
61. Id.
62. See Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd sub nom. Salazar v. Buono,
130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
63. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 779-81.
64. See id at 780.
65. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
66. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780.
67. See Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1160 n.13 (10th Cir. 2010) (suggesting
that the endorsement of Christianity is even stronger because two of the crosses at issue were
located immediately outside the Highway Patrol office); see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677,
701 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that "the display's placement on the capitol
grounds ... suggest that the State itself intended the . .. nonreligious aspects of the tablets' message
to predominate"); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 599-600 (1989) (finding that because
the creche at issue sat on the grand staircase of the courthouse, "[n]o viewer could reasonably think
that it occupies th[e] location without the support and approval of the government").
68. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding that a crbche included in a
Christmas display did not have a primary message of endorsing Christianity because it was
surrounded by other secular symbols); see also Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 702 (suggesting that because
the Ten Commandments monument at issue was surrounded by other monuments and historical
markers, it primarily conveyed a secular message); Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1159-60 (concluding that
the crosses at issue conveyed a primarily sectarian message because there were no "contextual or
historical elements that served to secularize the message conveyed by such a display").
69. See Jason Marques, Note, To Bear a Cross: The Establishment Clause, Historic
Preservation, and Eminent Domain Intersect at the Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial, 59 FLA. L.
REv. 829, 848 (2007).
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depends on the reasonable observer,70 who could fluctuate between two
extremes when looking at the perceived message.7 ' The observer can
either be too sensitive in believing that the display endorses religion, or
overly insensitive in not seeing the potential conveyance of a
government message endorsing religion.72 Since the Endorsement test
does not give guidance on which perception should be afforded more
weight, the jurisprudence under this rule is "fraught with futility."73
C.

The Neutrality Test

The U.S. Supreme Court has sometimes utilized the Neutrality test
to analyze various Establishment Clause challenges.74 In Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris,75 the Court held that a government program providing
direct tuition aid to families did not violate the Establishment Clause,
despite the fact that the aid went almost entirely to parochial schools and
not one public school elected to partake in the program.7 6 In articulating
its decision, the Court regarded neutrality as the key aspect of this
program.77 It stated that a program is neutral and does not violate the
Establishment Clause if it "provides assistance directly to a broad class
of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools
wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private
choice."78 In McCreary County v. ACL U, 79 the companion case to Van
Orden v. Perry,8 0 the Court extended the neutrality principle to a public
display case. 8 1 The Court reiterated the importance of the Lemon
purpose prong and treated the hallmark question of Establishment
Clause inquiries as whether the government is remaining neutral
between different religious systems, as well as between religion and
nonreligion.82

70. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 773.
71. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 696-97 (Thomas, J., concurring) (reflecting the two opposite
viewpoints when it comes to Establishment Clause challenges).
72. See id.
73. Id. at 697.
74. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 874-76 (2005); Zelman v. SimmonsHarris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809, 829 (2000).
75. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
76. Id. at 645, 647, 662-63.
77. Id. at 662.
78. Id. at 652.
79. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
80. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
81. See McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 88 1.
82. See id. at 871, 873, 875-76, 881.
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The Coercion Test

In his concurrence in Van Orden, Justice Thomas suggested that
adopting a Coercion test for Establishment Clause inquiries would
evince some sort of consistency in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. The Court does not have to judge the religiousness of
the symbol, but rather only has to look at whether it forces a person to
engage in religious behavior. 8 4 The hallmark of this test is whether there
exists "actual legal coercion."85 This legal coercion involves "coercion
of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and
threat ofpenalty."86 If the monument is passive, not mandating a person
to observe a specific religion, or for that matter, even to look at it, there
is no coercion. If a person can simply choose to turn his or her back
and walk away from the symbol, it does not violate the Establishment
Clause. 88
Justice Thomas advocated this test because it does not detract from
the religious significance of these symbols.8 9 It allows the display to
retain its significance but also allows it to remain standing as long as the
public is not forced to worship a specific religion.90 Additionally, this
test prevents a broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause, under
which all religious symbols are invalidated merely because an overlysensitive person may be uncomfortable with a public display of a
religious symbol. 9 1 Under the Coercion test, a religious symbol is
invalid only if it exerts the type of coercion that interferes with
"religious liberty." 92

83. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 697 (Thomas, J., concurring). This concept was first defined
in Lee v. Weisman, in which the Court found that Rhode Island's "practice of including invocations
and benedictions in public school graduations violated the Establishment Clause." 505 U.S. 577,
584, 599 (1992). The Court stated that this practice was coercive, even though the student had the
option to not attend the graduation ceremony, because graduation is an important right of passage
that most students would not want to miss. Id. at 595.
84. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 697.
85. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 52 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
86. Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 694.
88. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 664 (1989).
89. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. 577 at 694-96 (discussing that in order to have these symbols
pass constitutional muster, most people attempt to declare these essentially religious symbols as not
having religious significance).
90. See id. at 697.
91. See Richard M. Esenberg, You Cannot Lose If You Choose Not to Play: Toward a More
Modest Establishment Clause, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 1, 63 (2006) (suggesting that it is
"better to abandon the charade that everyone's discomfort can be avoided").
92. Id. at 61-62.
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E. Van Orden v. Perry: History and Nature of the Monument Test
The U.S. Supreme Court stated in its plurality opinion in Van
Orden that some of the most recent Establishment Clause cases do not
apply the Lemon test because it is not useful as a definitive test that can
be applied in every instance. 9 3 Rather, the Court concluded that the more
helpful approach for a "passive monument" 94 would be to analyze the
"nature of the monument and ... [the] Nation's history." 95 In doing so,
the Court must look to both the past and present, deciding whether a
religiously significant monument has a place in the history of our
nation.96 As long as the monument is passive97 and does not have a
"plainly religious purpose," it should not be removed.98 The underlying
reasoning for this is that both God and religion have played a significant
role in our Nation's history, and the Court does not want to "evince a
hostility to religion by disabling the government from in some ways
recognizing our religious heritage." 99 However, the Court must be
cautious in using this test to ensure that, in welcoming religion, the
government does not subsequently force religion upon those who do not
believe in it.'0o
F.

Summary of the Court'sApproach

Overall, the U.S. Supreme Court has had an inconsistent approach
to past Establishment Clause cases.' 0 This is evidenced by the fact that
the Court used two different controlling tests for Van Orden and
McCreary, which were companion cases decided on the same day.' 02 Of
the many tests the Court has articulated, it has not established one as the
controlling test.' 0 3 "Every new case accepted for argument presents the
very real possibility that the Court might totally abandon its previous

93. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686 (majority opinion).
94. Id
95. Id
96. See id. at 683.
97. See id. at 690-91 (suggesting that a "Kentucky statute requiring the posting of the Ten
Commandments in every public schoolroom" violated the Establishment Clause because it
"confronted elementary school students every day," but the Ten Commandments monument at issue
in that case did not because the public could avoid it).
98. Id. at 690.
99. Id. at 684, 687.
100. Seeidat683.
101. See id. at 694 (Thomas, J., concurring); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); GARRY, supra note 23, at 54.
102. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) (Neutrality test); Van Orden,
545 U.S. 677, 686 (majority opinion) (History and Nature of the Monument test).
103. See, e.g., Marshall,supra note 40, at 194.
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efforts and start over."1 04 As a result, one can only speculate as to
whether the court will find that the display at issue violates the
Establishment Clause, especially since it is equally unclear which test
will be used to evaluate the alleged violation. 105
IV.

THE COURT'S OVERALL APPROACH TOWARDS CROSSES

With no definitive rule in place, the lower courts have had an
inconsistent approach towards Establishment Clause violations
involving crosses. o0 However, despite this inconsistency, these courts
have provided some structure. Several key principles demonstrating
when crosses do and do not violate the Establishment Clause have
emerged from the various cases that have been decided by the federal
courts and the Unites States Supreme Court.' 07
A. Examples of When Crosses Have Violated the Establishment Clause
The federal courts have heard many Establishment Clause cases
involving crosses. 108 Quite often, the courts hold that the cross at issue
violates the Establishment Clause.109 A clear violation has been found in
four situations.110 Two such situations are when the cross is the main
feature of the display without any surrounding elements and when the
cross is erected with a primarily religious purpose."' Crosses also
violate the Establishment Clause when the government plays a major
104. Id.
105. See LEVY, supra note 14, at 221 ("The Court has reaped the scorn of a confused and
aroused public because it has been erratic and unprincipled in its decisions.").
106. See id at 220.
107. See generally Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763
(1995) (suggesting that as long as both religious and nonreligious groups have access to erect
displays in the public area, the cross should not violate the Establishment Clause); ACLU v. Rabun
Cnty. Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d 1098, 1111 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding that crosses that
do not have a clear secular purpose violate the Establishment Clause); Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc.
v. City of Eugene, 558 P.2d 338, 347 (Or. 1976) (finding that crosses that are sponsored by a secular
organization do not violate the Establishment Clause).
108. Marques, supra note 69, at 855 (suggesting that federal courts frequently encounter these
types of cases).
109. Id.
110. See Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1160 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding that a
cross memorial violates the Establishment Clause when it is standing alone and not part of a display
and surrounded by other symbols); Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd sub
nom. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (finding that a cross is a violation when the
government is highly involved in maintaining it); Separation of Church & State Comm. v. City of
Eugene, 93 F.3d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding a violation solely because the cross is a
prominent symbol of Christianity); Rabun Cnty. Chamber of Commerce, 698 F.2d at 1111 (finding
that a cross violates the Establishment Clause when it is erected with a religious purpose).
111. See Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1160; Rabun Cnty. Chamber of Commerce, 698 F.2d at 1111.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2011

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 7

734

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:723

part in the creation of the cross display, going to great lengths not only
to erect it, but also to prevent its removal. 112 Lastly, in some cases, the
courts have found a violation simply because the display is a cross and
crosses are the preeminent symbol of Christianity." 3
The first situation in which the courts have found a violation of the
Establishment Clause is if a cross is erected as the main feature of the
display and is devoid of any secular or diverse religious content.114 In
Duncan, the Tenth Circuit found that if a cross stands alone, with no
secular elements, there is nothing to detract from the religious
message.115 Furthermore, in Carpenter v. City & County of San
Francisco,1 16 the Ninth Circuit found that when a cross is the only
religious symbol erected, it becomes a prominent display of Christianity,
conveying and endorsing a religious message. 117 The Ninth Circuit
analyzed the cross display for a violation of the "No Preference" Clause
of the California Constitution, which uses the exact language of the
Establishment Clause."' The court found that the cross at issue violated
the "No Preference" Clause because it stood alone and there were no
other religious displays that would help detract from the religious
significance of the cross." 9 The Ninth Circuit found it irrelevant that the
cross had been on display since 1934.120 The fact that a cross may stand
uncontested for a long period of time does not eliminate the
religiousness of a symbol standing alone. 12 Historical meaning is not
automatically imposed based on the passage of time. 122 According to
this court, there has to be something more that occurs, such as the
naming of the cross as a "historical landmark[,]" in order for it to take on
a historical meaning separate from its religious meaning.123
Where, in erecting a cross, the government has a clear religious
purpose, the courts have found a violation of the Establishment

112. See Norton, 371 F.3d at 550.
113. See Separation of Church & State Comm., 93 F.3d at 620.
114. See Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1160; Carpenter v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 93 F.3d 627, 629-30
(9th Cir. 1996) (analysis under the California constitution's "No Preference" Clause).
115. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1160.
116. 93 F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 1996).
117. See id. at 630.
118. Id. at 628. Since the "No Preference" Clause of the California constitution uses the exact
language of the Establishment Clause, the facts of this case are useful in the current analysis of the
Establishment Clause. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, §4.
119. Carpenter, 93 F.3d at 630, 632.
120. Id. at 629, 631.
121. See id. at 631.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 631-32.
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Clause. 124 In that situation, the government is taking a side and
promoting not only that specific religion, but also religion over
nonreligion.125 Thus, the government no longer maintains a neutral
position towards religion.12 6 For example, in ACLU v. Rabun County
Chamber of Commerce,12 7 the Eleventh Circuit found that the cross at
issue had a religious purpose not only because crosses are a symbol of
Christianity, but also because the cross was set to be completed in time
for a dedication at the Easter religious services.12 8 This cross clearly was
to be used for religious services, rendering its purpose essentially

religious.129
Furthermore, the court in Rabun County Chamber of Commerce
stated that even if a secular purpose had existed, the cross would still
violate the Establishment Clause because "a government may not
'employ religious means to reach a secular goal unless secular means are
wholly unavailing.,, 13 0 Thus, according to the Eleventh Circuit, if there
is a secular means of achieving a certain goal, it must be utilized instead
of the religious means.' 3 ' The stronger the connection to religion, the
more a court will be inclined to find a violation of the Establishment
Clause, even if a secular purpose can be articulated. 132
Some courts have also found that crosses violate the Establishment
Clause if the government is highly involved in the creation of the cross
and tries to protect it from removal. 33 In Buono v. Norton,13 4 the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that a Latin cross erected in the
Mojave Desert violated the Establishment Clause because the
government went to great lengths to prevent its removal.13 5 Thus, a
reasonable observer, aware of the history of this specific cross, would
view it as an endorsement of Christianity.' 36 The Ninth Circuit did not

124. See ACLU v. Rabun Cnty. Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d 1098, 1111 (11th Cir.
1983).
125. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 875 (2005).
126. See id.
127. 698 F.2d 1098 (11 th Cir. 1983).
128. Id.atlll0-11.
129. Seeid.atllII.
130. Id. (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring)).
131. See id.
132. See id. (finding that even though there was secular purpose, using religious means to
achieve that purpose strengthened the message of endorsement).
133. See Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd sub nom. Salazar v. Buono,
130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
134. 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'dsub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
135. See id. at 544, 550.
136. See id at 550 (citation omitted).
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find the fact that the cross was erected in the desert, a remote location, to
be determinative. 3 7 Even though the cross was not erected near any
governmental structures, the religiousness of the symbol was not
minimized.13 8 While it is important to note that the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed this decision in Salazar v. Buono,'39 the Court's opinion in
Salazar focused solely on the validity of a land transfer statute, and not
whether the cross could be perceived as an endorsement of
Christianity. 140 Thus, the Ninth Circuit's argument is still a valid
viewpoint regarding how crosses can violate the Establishment Clause
and is relevant to this overall discussion. 141
Lastly, cross displays have violated the Establishment Clause in
some instances solely because the cross is a prominent symbol of
Christianity.1 4 2 In Separation of Church & State Committee v. City of
Eugene,143 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that a fiftyfoot Latin cross violated the Establishment Clause because the Latin
cross is a symbol of Christianity and could be recognized as government
endorsement of Christianity.'" Similarly, the Ninth Circuit took the
same position in its decision in Norton. The court found that the cross
display violated the Establishment Clause because it would convey an
endorsement of religion to the reasonable observer precisely because the
cross is a Christian symbol.1 45

137. Id. at 549.
138. Id.
139. 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
140. See The Supreme Court, 2009 Term - Leading Cases, 124 HARV. L. REV. 179, 219-22
(2010). After a permanent injunction enjoining the display of the cross was affirmed in Norton,
Congress passed a defense appropriations bill that would transfer the ownership of the land the cross
was mounted on to the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Id. at 221. Thus, the cross would no longer stand
on public land, as an endorsement of the Christian religion. See id. The Court's opinion in Salazar
analyzed the land transfer, holding that a prior injunction enjoining the land transfer statute be
reversed. Id. at 222. The Court focused its analysis on why the land transfer should be valid, and
even suggested that the cross would no longer be subject to the Endorsement test now that the land
was owned by a private entity. Id. at 222-23.
141. See id. at 222 (stating that the Court in Salazar focused its attention on the validity of a
land transfer statute).
142. See Separation of Church & State Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617, 620 (9th Cir.
1996).
143. 93 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 1996).
144. See id. at 618, 620.
145. See Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 545, 550 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd sub nom. Salazar v.
Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (citation omitted).
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B. Examples of When Crosses Have Not Violated the Establishment
Clause
In cases where no violation was found, the courts have been
cautious in their approach, upholding crosses as permissible under the
Establishment Clause only under certain limited circumstances. 146
Crosses do not violate the Establishment Clause in three situations. 14 7
Crosses have been permitted to remain standing if they have an
unequivocal secular purpose, such as to memorialize the deceased, or if
they are sponsored or funded by a secular organization. 148 Additionally,
cross displays do not violate the Establishment Clause if all religions
have equal access to the area in which the display is mounted. 149
Crosses that have a clear secular purpose do not violate the
Establishment Clause.150 Such a purpose detracts from the religious
message of the display, leading the reasonable observer to believe the
cross is not endorsing the Christian religion. 5 1 For example, in Eugene
Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene,1 5 2 the Supreme Court of Oregon
set aside a decree it had previously issued holding that a large cross in a
municipal park violated the Establishment Clause. 15 3 That court
concluded that, due to changed circumstances, the cross no longer
violated the Establishment Clause when evaluated under the Lemon
test.15 4 The court found that the cross now had a secular purpose because
the voters of the city passed a charter amendment making the cross a
memorial to U.S. war veterans. 5 5 A public ceremony officially
dedicated the cross to these veterans,' 56 and the citizens now accept this
cross as a permanent war memorial. 15 7 Thus, it has a clear secular

146. See generally Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763
(1995) (finding the cross did not violate the Establishment Clause because the area in which it was
erected was accessible for all); Paul v. Dade Cnty., 202 So. 2d 833, 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967)
(suggesting that crosses that have a clear secular purpose should be allowed to remain standing);
Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 558 P.2d 338, 347 (Or. 1976) (finding that a cross
funded by a secular organization did not violate the Establishment Clause).
147. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 763; Paul, 202 So. 2d at 835; Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc., 558
P.2d at 347.
148. See Paul,202 So. 2d at 835; Eugene Sand & Gravel,Inc., 558 P.2d at 347.
149. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 763.
150. See Eugene Sand & Gravel,Inc., 558 P.2d at 346.
151. See id.
152. 558 P.2d 338 (Or. 1976).
153. See id at 349.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 340, 347.
156. See id
157. See id.
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purpose, and no longer conveys the message of religious endorsement
that it previously had.158
Similarly, in Paul v. Dade County,'59 the Court of Appeals for the
Third District of Florida found that a string of lights in the shape of a
cross placed on the Dade County Courthouse did not violate the
Establishment Clause. 160 In this instance, the cross did not violate the
Establishment Clause because it was not initially erected with the
purpose of advancing religion. 6' The string of lights in the shape of a
cross was erected to decorate the streets for Christmas, intending to
bring more shoppers into the area.162 The court focused on the fact that
the cross display did not "promote the participation by anyone in the
affairs of any religious organizations or sect." 63
Furthermore, cross displays do not violate the Establishment Clause
when they are funded and maintained by a secular organization, keeping
the government from being directly involved.164 In Eugene Sand &
Gravel, Inc., the court noted that a key fact in its determination was that
the city was not involved in the planning or organization of the display
of the cross. 16 The court explained that the secular message conveyed
by the cross is strengthened by the fact that the display was sponsored by
a secular organization.1 66 These facts kept the cross at issue from
becoming unnecessarily intertwined with the government, thus
preventing it from endorsing the Christian religion.' 67 Likewise, the
Paul Court found it important that absolutely no public funds were used,
or would be used in the future, to maintain the cross erected on the Dade
County Courthouse.16 8 The court argued that, by allowing private
persons to fund and maintain a cross with a clear secular purpose, the
government was not using its own power to organize and manage this

158. See id. at 349.
159. 202 So. 2d 833 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
160. Id.at835.
161. See id
162. Id
163. Id
164. See Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 558 P.2d 338, 347 (Or. 1976); see also
Paul, 202 So. 2d at 835.
165. 558 P.2d at 347.
166. See id.
167. Id.
168. See Paul,202 So. 2d at 835. Cf Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc., 558 P.2d at 347 (stating that
the excessive entanglement "requirement is not violated by the fact of payment by the government
for maintenance of the display of a religious 'symbol,' although the requirement is violated if the
government participates in an active manner in the planning and organization of activities which
involve such a display").
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cross.' 69 Thus, there could be no conclusion that the State was endorsing
the Christian religion because it was not using its money "to support,
aid, maintain[,] or establish any religion or religious edifices."1o
If the public place in which the cross is erected permits a variety of
groups to use the space, the cross does not violate the Establishment
Clause. 7' In Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette,17 2 the
Supreme Court held that a cross erected by the Ku Klux Klan in a public
plaza next to the statehouse did not violate the Establishment Clause.17 3
Neutrality was the touchstone of the Court's inquiry.174 The Court
focused on the fact that in the past other religions had been permitted to
erect displays of their choosing in the public plaza. 17 5 While the Court
viewed this as a public forum for private expression in which the Free
Speech Clause would govern, it still analyzed this cross under the
Establishment Clause.17 6 The determinative factor in Pinette was that all
private groups were granted the same access to the park for the purpose
of erecting a display.177 The application process was equal for each
private group seeking to use that space.178 The Court found that the
government does not endorse religion by permitting its access to a forum
to which all other nonreligious displays have access.1 79 It further stated
that in the current Establishment Clause precedent, the Court has never
held it unconstitutional to enact policies that may have an incidental
effect of benefiting religion, as long as those policies are neutral to the
population as a whole. 80 Thus, there is no Establishment Clause
violation as long as equal access to the public space is granted to all.' 8'
V.

CROSSES USED AS ROADSIDE MEMORIALS Do NOT VIOLATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

In the most recent court case involving crosses erected as roadside
memorials, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See Paul, 202 So. 2d 833 at 835.
Id.
See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995).
515 U.S. 753 (1995).
Id. at 757-58, 770.
See id. at 763-66.
See id. at 758, 763.
See id.at 759-61.
See id at 763.
Id
Id. at 763-64.
See id. at 764.
Id. at 770.
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memorial at issue violated the Establishment Clause. 182 In American
Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan,'8 3 the court found that crosses erected as
roadside memorials for fallen highway patrol officers violated the
Establishment Clause.' 84 The Utah Highway Patrol Association
("UHPA"), a non-profit organization, wanted to memorialize officers
who had passed away while on duty for the Utah Highway Patrol
("UHP").'85 After much thought, the UHPA felt the best way to achieve
this purpose was to erect "twelve-foot high crosses ... [which
contained] [t]he fallen trooper's name, rank, and badge number ... [as
well as] the UHP's official 'beehive' symbol[,] . .. the year the trooper
died[,] and a small plaque containing a picture of the trooper and some
biographical information."' 8 6 The UHPA stated that these memorials
were to serve as a reminder that an officer gave his life while on duty
trying to keep the public safe, to praise the officer, and to encourage the
public to continue driving safely while on the highway. 8 7 The UHPA
felt that the easiest and quickest way to convey these messages to the
public driving past the memorials at high speeds on the highway was by
erecting crosses.' 88 The UHPA even obtained permission from the
officers' families to use a cross as the prominent symbol of the
memorial.18 9 After mounting the first cross in 1998 on private property,
the UHPA sought and was granted permission by the State of Utah to
assemble more crosses on public property.190 In total, the UHPA
mounted thirteen crosses, some located on private land and others on
public land.191 The crosses were funded privately and maintained by the
UHPA. 192
The American Atheists organization brought suit against the state
employees who approved the mounting of the crosses on public land,
alleging that the crosses violated the Establishment Clause.'9 3 The Tenth
Circuit analyzed these crosses under the Lemon test and found that there
was indeed a violation of the Establishment Clause.' 94 While there was a
secular purpose in erecting the crosses, the Court found that they had the
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1164 (10th Cir. 2010).
616 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1150.
Id.
Id.at1150-51.
Id.at1150.
Id. at 1150-51.
Id. at 1151.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1151-52.
Id. at 1156-61, 1164.
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primary effect of supporting Christianity.195 A cross is the predominant
symbol of Christianity and "can only be allowed if [its] context or
history avoid the conveyance of a message of governmental
endorsement of religion."' 96 The Duncan Court found that in the context
in which these cross memorials were used, there was the clear message
of endorsement.' 9 7 The crosses stood alone, with no other displays to
help secularize them.198 The UHPA mounted the majority of the crosses
on public land, and they bore the UHP's insignia. 199 Moreover, other
symbols were available to memorialize the officers instead of a cross.200
The court found that all of these factors could lead a reasonable observer
to believe that the state was endorsing Christianity.2 0 1
The Tenth Circuit in Duncan interpreted the Establishment Clause
too narrowly.202 Crosses, when used as roadside memorials, should not
203
violate the Establishment Clause.20 Crosses that are used in this context
satisfy the criteria of each of the tests the U.S. Supreme Court has
proposed in approaching Establishment Clause challenges.2 04
A. Roadside Crosses Satisfy the Three Prongs of the Lemon Test
Crosses as roadside memorials do not violate the Establishment
Clause when evaluated under the Lemon test. 20 5 First, there is a secular
purpose in erecting these crosses because they are used to portray a
symbol of death.206 Therefore, they do not stand for the alternative
195. Id at 1157, 1161.
196. Id.at 1160.
197. Id.
198. Id
199. Id
200. See id at 1161 (stating that "the military provides soldiers and their families with a
number of different religious symbols that they may use on government-issued headstones or
markers").
201. Id at 1150.
202. See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1818 (2010).
203. Id.
204. See supra Part III.A (discussing the Lemon test). See generally Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1818
(suggesting that a cross on the side of a highway memorializing a highway trooper does not need to
be viewed as government support of religion).
205. See generally Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1820 (stating that the primary effect is that of a
memorial because the cross is not just a symbol of Christianity, it is also a symbol of death);
Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1157-58 (suggesting that as long as the cross has the purpose of being a
memorial, it satisfies the first prong of the Lemon test); Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of
Eugene, 558 P.2d 338, 347 (Or. 1976) (finding that a cross that is created and maintained by a
private party does not violate the third prong of the Lemon test).
206. See Matthew Carberry, Comment to Cross Memorials on Government Land, THE
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 23, 2010, 4:38 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/04/23/cross-memorialson-government-land/ (suggesting that if the primary purpose of the cross is to be a memorial, then
the shape of the cross should be secondary).
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symbol of Christianity.20 7 Crosses, when used as roadside memorials,
are genuine expressions of grief by the deceased's loved ones, and serve
the purpose of helping them navigate through the grieving process. 208 In
Duncan, the Tenth Circuit found it straightforward that as long as the
crosses were erected with the purpose of memorializing the deceased, a
secular purpose can be found. 2 09 Thus, when a cross is erected as a
roadside memorial, its primary purpose is secular in that it serves as a
memorial; it is not primarily erected in order to advance the Christian
religion. 2 10 When the cross has this unequivocal secular purpose, just as
a roadside cross does, some lower courts have found that the government
cannot be viewed as allowing the cross to remain standing with the
purpose of promoting a religion.2 11
Second, given that crosses are widely used in the context of
roadside memorials, the primary effect is not the endorsement of
religion.2 12 The results of a survey mailed to the Director of Transport in
each of the fifty stateS2 13 showed that "the cross is a dominant feature of
most roadside memorials" and "is typically the memorial when a
religious symbol is displayed." 2 14 Additionally, to highlight how
widespread this practice is, one business, called "Roadside Memorials,"
sold several hundred crosses to be used as roadside memorials.2 15 While
it is true that crosses are widely used because the majority of people who
construct roadside memorials are Christian, it has been found that these
crosses are rarely erected as an expression of religion.2 16 Many have
articulated that they chose the cross because of a cultural custom of
using crosses to honor the dead.2 17 Thus, this widespread use can be
attributed to the fact that crosses have become "a cross-cultural symbol
of death." 21 8 This cultural custom creates a primary effect of
memorializing the dead.21 9

207. See id
208. See Melissa Villanueva, "Resting Places" Documentary clip 1, YOUTUBE (May 22,
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-Kmy8zfkdHAY.
209. See Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1157.
210. See id
211. See Paul v. Dade Cnty., 202 So. 2d 833, 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Eugene Sand &
Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 558 P.2d 338, 346 (Or. 1976).
212. See George E. Dickinson & Heath C. Hoffmann, Roadside Memorial Policies in the
UnitedStates, 15 MORTALITY 154, 164 (2010).
213. Id. at 157.
214. Id. at 164.
215. Urbina, supra note 3 at A19.
216. See Dickinson & Hoffmann, supranote 212, at 164.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See id.
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The fact that the cross is not a universal symbol of death for all
religious and nonreligious people, but is a Christian symbol of death,
does not diminish the primary effect of memorializing the deceased.220
There is no question that a cross is the paramount symbol of Christianity
and is used primarily by Christians as a memorial. 22 1 This leaves the
possibility that the memorial could be perceived as a governmental
endorsement of Christianity.222 However, in the plurality opinion in
Salazar, Justice Kennedy stated that even though the cross is a symbol
of Christianity, it is not merely just that.223 The cross "is a symbol often
used to honor and respect those whose heroic acts, noble contributions,
and patient striving help secure an honored place in history for this
Nation and its people."2 24 In his concurrence, Justice Alito even
suggested that the removal of the cross at issue in the case would be
viewed by many as disrespectful towards the soldiers whom the cross
memorialized. 2 25 The cross itself is a public act of grieving and serves as
a "physical marker of memory."22 6 The fact that the cross is so widely
used as a memorial and is known as a symbol marking the memory of
those who have passed, ensures that the primary message conveyed to
the observer is that a person has passed away.227 Its effect is that it
honors the deceased, not that the government is endorsing the Christian
228
religion.
Finally, excessive entanglement with the government does not exist
because the private party, not the government, maintains how the cross
will be displayed.22 9 In Lemon, the Supreme Court stated that in looking
at the entanglement prong, the court must scrutinize "the resulting
relationship between the government and the religious authority."23 0 In
Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc., the Oregon Supreme Court stated that

220. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1820 (2010).
221. See Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1161 (10th Cir. 2010).
222. See id.; Separation of Church & State Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617, 620 (9th
Cir. 1996) (stating that "[t]here is no question that the Latin cross is a symbol of Christianity" and it
"may reasonably be perceived as governmental endorsement of Christianity").
223. Salazar, 130 S. Ct. 1820.
224. Id.
225. See id. at 1822-23 (Alito, J., concurring).
226. See Rosa-Linda Fregoso, Professor & Chair, Latin Am. & Latino Studies Univ. of Cal.,
Santa Cruz, Keynote Address at Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law & Justice Symposium: Gender &
Migration: We Want Them Alive!: The Culture and Politics of Human Rights (Nov. 18, 2005), in
22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 367, 374 (2007).
227. See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1820 (majority opinion); see also Dickinson & Hoffmann,
supra note 212, at 164.
228. See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1820.
229. Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 558 P.2d 338, 347 (Or. 1976).
230. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971).
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excessive entanglement exists when the government is actively involved
in "the planning or organization of any activities which involve the
display." 2 3 1 In that instance, the court even went so far as to conclude
that the entanglement prong is not violated even if the government pays
for the maintenance of the cross.232 As the government intertwines itself
with the cross, it runs the risk of creating the image of endorsement that
the lower courts shy away from.233 In the case of a roadside memorial,
however, the private party who wants to memorialize its loved one erects
the cross memorial and maintains it.234 This private party may be a
secular organization or an individual.2 35 No matter which it is, the courts
have authorized these groups to maintain a cross memorial because it
does not result in a relationship of entanglement between the
government and the religious symbol.2 36
B. Roadside CrossesDo Not Convey A Message ofEndorsement to A
Reasonable Informed Observer
Crosses as roadside memorials do not violate the Establishment
Clause when evaluated under the Endorsement test. 23 7 The reasonable
observer is required to have knowledge of the important background
history of the symbol at issue. 238 A reasonable observer in this context
would know that the main reason for the use of a cross is not for the
endorsement or disapproval of a specific religion. 2 39 Rather, the cross is
erected in order to memorialize a life that is now lost. 2 40 This practice of
erecting a cross at the site of a highway death originated from the

231. Eugene Sand& Gravel, Inc., 558 P.2d at 347.
232. See id
233. See id.
234. See Andrew O'Connor, Roadside crosses a stark reminder, ABC NEWS,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/08/12/2980974.htm (stating that it is usually the family
and friends of the deceased person who erect these memorials) (last updated Aug. 12, 2010).
235. See, e.g., Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1150 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating that
a secular organization erected the crosses at issue); Stepzinski, supra note 1 (stating that the
daughter of the deceased erected a cross that will be removed in the future by the Georgia
Department of Transportation).
236. See Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc., 558 P.2d at 347 (finding no entanglement when private
party maintained the cross and organized activities involving it).
237. See supra Part III.B (discussing the Endorsement test). See also Chris Travers, Comment
to Cross Memorials on Government Land, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 23, 2010, 5:26 PM),
http://volokh.com/2010/04/23/cross-memorials-on-govemment-land/ (suggesting that the message
conveyed to observers of cross memorials is to remember those who have died).
238. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780-81 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
239. See Dickinson & Hoffmann, supra note 212, at 164.
240. See id at 162.
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Hispanic culture in the Southwest. 241 In New Mexico, when a person
passed away, the funeral procession would carry the coffin while
walking to the burial site.242 Every time a break was taken, a memorial
would be erected in the spot where the people carrying the coffin
stopped to rest. 2 43 These memorials were usually two branches in the
form of a cross and were called Descansos. 244 As cars became more
widely used, and the rate of fatal car accidents grew, this practice spread
to the highways and the crosses were mounted at the scene of deadly
accidents.24 5 A reasonable observer who is aware of this backdrop would
understand that the use of roadside memorials is a practice with deep
historical roots, and is in no way intended to serve as an endorsement of
the Christian religion.24 6
Furthermore, the reasonable observer would know that crosses are
often used as memorials.2 47 Private parties erect crosses as roadside
memorials to honor those who have passed away.248 The message
conveyed by these crosses is "remember th[o]se who have died" instead
of remember the Christian religion. 2 49 Thus, the message perceived by
the reasonable observer would be one of death and memory instead of
religious endorsement. 2 50 Additionally, a reasonable observer may also
view these crosses as a reminder of the great possibility for danger while
driving. 251 These roadside crosses raise recognition among the public of
how common fatal car accidents are.252 Therefore, a reasonable observer
will also be reminded of "humanity and mortality," rather than feel
alienated by the government for its religious preference.253
In Duncan, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that
the crosses at issue violated the Establishment Clause because they stood
alone with no other secular symbols, were adorned with a government

241.
242.

See RUDOLFO ANAYA ET AL., DESCANSOS: AN INTERRUPTED JOURNEY 14 (1995).
Id.

243. Id. at 15.
244. Id. at 18.
245. Id. at 28.
246. See generally id. (explaining the deep history behind roadside cross memorials).
247. See Dickinson & Hoffmann, supra note 212, at 164.
248. See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1820 (2010).
249. Travers, supranote 237.
250. See id
251. See Suzie Whitman, Opinion, Roadside remembrance, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Oct. 9,
2010, 2:46 AM), http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/opinion/localvoices/stories/DNwhitman 09edi.ART.State.Editionl.33c7abd.html.
252. See id.
253. Lisa, Comment to Should Roadside Memorials Be Banned?, ROOM FOR DEBATE
(July 12, 2009, 10:05 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/should-roadside
memorials-be-banned/.
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emblem, and were large in size.254 The court stated that these factors
could convey a message of endorsement of the Christian religion to a
reasonable observer.25 5 While the courts have been more inclined to find
a violation when the cross display lacks any secular elements, this does
not rule out crosses used as roadside memorials. 256 When a cross is
erected as a roadside memorial, it has the secular purpose of conveying
the message of memory.25 7 There does not need to be anything else
present to secularize it because, in this special context, the cross itself is
functioning in a secular capacity.2 58 It no longer becomes a symbol of
Christianity, but a symbol of death and respect for the deceased person it
honors.259
When the government puts its own emblem on the cross, a
perceived connection of the government to the cross is more likely to
surface. 2 60 A reasonable observer might be more inclined to view it as a
government endorsement of the Christian religion, fearing that
Christians will receive preferential treatment from the government.2 6 1
However, the reasonable observer, who is the guiding measure for the
Endorsement test analysis, is supposed to have knowledge of the history
of the memorial.26 2 An observer of a cross memorial that bears a
government symbol would be conscious of the fact that the cross is
memorializing a deceased public officer.2 63 If the reasonable observer
considers this fact, he or she would know that the government emblem is
featured on the cross to promote awareness that an officer passed away
while protecting the public. 2 6 The cross then becomes a tribute to those
who give their lives to protect others, and the reasonable observer would
be less prone to believe that the cross is endorsing the Christian
religion.26 5

254. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1162 (10th Cir. 2010).
255. Id. at 1160.
256. See id.at 1162.
257. See Stepzinski, supra note 1.
258. See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1820 (2010).
259. See id.; Judith, Comment to Should Roadside Memorials Be Banned?, ROOM FOR DEBATE
(July 12, 2009, 9:43 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/should-roadsidememorials-be-banned/; Stepzinski, supra note 1.
260. See Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1160.
261. See id.
262. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
263. Travers, supra note 237 (stating that the message perceived by a cross should be to
remember the deceased).
264. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780-81 (suggesting that the reasonable observer considers all of
the history as well as the context of the cross display).
265. See Travers, supra note 237; see also Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1820 (2010).
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The size of the cross also plays a role in whether a reasonable
observer is likely to view the memorial as a government endorsement of
Christianity. 266 The bigger the cross, the more likely a reasonable
observer will feel the government is favoring the Christian religion.267 A
large cross, however, would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a
cross, used as a roadside memorial, automatically violates the
Establishment Clause.268 A reasonable observer would be aware of the
fact that the cross may be large because the private party who erected it
wanted to ensure others would see it. 26 9 When a party erects a cross as a
memorial, it does not only serve as a place for loved ones of the
deceased to go to for help in their grieving process.270 It is also a way for
those loved ones to make the public aware of their loss, sending their
message that someone significant passed away. 271 Therefore, a
"reasonable, informed observer[,]" 2 72 aware of this message, would not
believe that the cross is endorsing the Christian religion.273
Some argue that "cemeteries [are] for mourning and reflection.
Highways belong to the [p]ublic." 2 7 4 Thus, these memorials are not
necessary to aid in the grieving process, and the potential for
endorsement outweighs the benefit that loved ones receive from erecting
these crosses as memorials.275 However, while cemeteries may provide
an outlet for grieving family members, the roadside memorial is a
personalized spot that they can go to in order to remember their loved
one. 2 7 6 As one mother stated about the roadside memorial for her
twenty-one-year-old daughter, "[e]very week I would go and place fresh
flowers there and sit, cry, scream, vent, whatever I needed to do at the
time[.]" 277 These memorials help the deceased's loved ones to grieve

266. See Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1162.
267. See id.
268. See generally Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780-81 (stating that the reasonable observer is aware of
the reason for the existence of the cross); Whitman, supra note 251 (explaining that families erect
roadside memorials so that they can convey an important message of safety to drivers on the
highway).
269. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780-81.
270. See Stepzinski, supra note 1; Whitman, supra note 251.
271. See Stepzinski, supra note 1.
272. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 773.
273. See id at 779-80.
274. Bohica, Comment to How should states handle roadside memorials?, CRIME SCENE KC
(June 4, 2010, 1:09 PM), http://blogs.kansascity.com/crimescene/2010/06/how-should-stateshandle-roadside-memoials.html.
275. See id. (suggesting that roadside memorials do not help in the grieving process and are
just a nuisance since cemeteries provide a place to mourn).
276. See Stepzinski, supra note 1.
277. Id.
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and heal from their loss. 27 8 They are the last spot that the deceased was
alive, and are places where those who are left behind can go to feel close
to them again. 27 9 Additionally, in some cases, the family may live far
from the cemetery where the deceased is buried. 28 0 This makes it
difficult for the family and friends to visit the deceased when they feel
the need to. 28 1 Sometimes, the roadside memorial is all that the family
has left to help remember its loved one.282 These roadside memorials
play a special part in the grieving process that a cemetery may not be
able to do. 283 The reasonable observer, considering the healing power of
these memorials, would therefore believe that they are not meant to
endorse the Christian religion.2 84
C. The PracticeofErecting Roadside Cross Memorials is Neutral
Towards All Religions
Crosses as roadside memorials also do not violate the
Establishment Clause when evaluated under the McCreary Neutrality
test. 2 85 The government does not favor one side over another when
allowing a private party to erect a cross as a roadside memorial.286 As
long as the government does not initiate the creation of the memorial,
determine its religious content, or later control it in any way, it remains
neutral toward the display.287 In allowing the memorial to be erected, the
government assists the deceased's family and friends in their grieving
process. 288 It is a result of the family and friends' own independent

278. See Harrop, supranote 4; O'Connor, supra note 234.
279. See Harrop, supranote 4.
280. See id.
281. See id.
282. See id.
283. See id.
284. See generally id. (reiterating how these memorials help the families to feel better and
heal).
285. See supra Part III.C (discussing the McCreary Neutrality test). See generally Dave,
Comment to Cross Memorials on Government Land, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 24, 2010,
7:39 AM), http://volokh.com/2010/04/23/cross-memorials-on-government-land/
(stating that
government does not prefer one religion over another in allowing roadside cross memorials to be
erected). Harrop, supra note 4 (suggesting that family and friends erect cross memorials on their
own initiative and the government remains neutral in allowing them to do so).
286. See Dave, supranote 285.
287. See Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 558 P.2d 338, 347 (Or. 1976)
(suggesting that the government did not become entangled with the cross at issue because it was not
involved in the creation or maintenance of the memorial; thus, the government remained neutral
towards the display).
288. See Harrop, supranote 4.
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choice that they take advantage of this assistance and erect a cross to
memorialize their loved one. 289
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated that cross displays do
not violate the Establishment Clause when the public space allows
various groups to erect a display of their choosing. 2 9 0 When the
government allows alternative symbols-even alternative religious
symbols-to be erected along the public roads, it remains neutral to the
entire population. 2 9 1 The government neither limits which groups are
allowed to erect roadside memorials, nor does it only allow religious
29
symbols over non-religious ones.292
The cross is not the only symbol
allowed, and therefore, a variety of symbols, whether secular or
religious, is used in memorializing the deceased.29 3 There is no
preference for one type of memorial over another-all are allowed.
Thus, the government remains neutral when allowing loved ones to erect
a memorial cross.2 94
D. Roadside Cross Memorials Do Not Coerce the Public to Observe
the ChristianReligion
Moreover, crosses as roadside memorials do not violate the
Coercion test as articulated by Justice Thomas.2 95 The government is not
forcing anyone to accept a religion, believe in that specific religion, or
even expend money on it. 2 96 A cross memorial is different from a law
passed with the intent of obligating the public to do something
affirmative. 297 A passive symbol does not impose a duty on the public to

289. See id (suggesting that roadside memorials are usually put up by the friends and family
independently of the government); Stepzinski, supra note 1.
290. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763-65 (1995).
291. See id at 763-64; see also Leslie C. Griffin, Fightingthe New Wars ofReligion: The Need
for a Tolerant FirstAmendment, 62 ME. L. REv. 23, 70-71 (2010) (stating that allowing a variety of
religious monuments to be erected reflects the tolerance of all religions and does not violate the
Establishment Clause).
292. See Urbina, supra note 3, at A19 (stating that there is "no federal law governing the
placement of' roadside memorials).
293. See Harrop,supra note 4 (describing different symbols that are used).
294. See id; see also Gordon Dickson, Despite Utah ruling, Texas roadside memorial crosses
are still legal, STAR-TELEGRAM (Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.star-telegram.com/2010/08/
20/2416463/despite-utah-ruling-texas-roadside.html (suggesting that allowing any religion to erect a
memorial for a loved one does not violate the Constitution).
295. See supra Part III.D (discussing Justice Thomas's Coercion test). See generally Cnty. of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 664 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that passive
displays can easily be ignored and walked away from); Dave, supra note 285 (stating that cross
memorials do not impose any obligations on the general public).
296. See Dave, supranote 285.
297. See id
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observe the Christian religion. 298 Furthermore, "[p]assersby who
disagree with the message conveyed by these displays are free to ignore
them, or even to turn their backs, just as they are free to do when they
disagree with any other form of government speech." 299 While the
observer may be a "'captive' audience," finding it hard to avoid looking
at the cross memorial,oo the government does not seek to force the
public to observe these memorials.o1 If the driver so chooses, he or she
can ignore the cross memorial's presence, without governmental or legal
consequences. 30 2 Roadside cross memorials do not compel the public to
adhere to specific principles or even to acknowledge its presence on the
side of the road; therefore, there is no coercion on the part of the
government.303
E. Roadside Crosses Have a Deep Secular History
Lastly, crosses as roadside memorials do not violate the
Establishment Clause when evaluated under the Van Orden History and
Nature of the Monument test.3 04 The history of how roadside cross
memorials originated from the Descansos shows that there is a
nonreligious foundation for why these memorials exist today. 305 This
secular history weakens the religious message conveyed by cross
memorials.306 Crosses used as roadside memorials also have a secular
nature because the deceased's family and friends erect them with the
307
purpose of memorializing a loved one who has passed away. They are
genuine expressions of grief, erected as part of the grieving process.30 s A
private party is the one to initiate the creation and assembly of the
display-the government merely gives it permission to erect the display
in order to help them in the grieving process.309
298. See id.
299. Cnty. ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 664.
300. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) ("The First Amendment permits the
government to prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when the 'captive' audience cannot avoid the
objectionable speech.").
301. See Cnty. ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 664.
302. See Dave, supra note 285.
303. See id.
304. See supra Part.Ill.E (discussing the Court's approach in Van Orden). See generally
Harrop, supra note 4 (stating that the nature of cross memorials is to aid in the grieving process);
ANAYA ET AL., supranote 241 (explaining the history behind cross roadside memorials).
305. See ANAYA ETAL., supranote 241, at 28-31, 34-35.

306. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690 (2005).
307. See, e.g., Harrop,supra note 4; Stepzinski, supra note 1.
308. See Villanueva,supra note 208.
309. See Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1151 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding that the
private party, and not the government, initiated the creation of these crosses).
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To read the Establishment Clause as prohibiting crosses when used
for the secular purpose of a roadside memorial is to read it too strictly.310
While the government has to be careful not to endorse a specific
religion, it still must make an effort to accommodate different
religions. 1 Sometimes the government cannot forbid religion from
entering the public realm and it has to accommodate a certain religion in
a reasonable manner.3 12 This is because religion is closely intertwined
with the history of man, causing the two at some points to be almost
indivisible.3 13 If the courts followed a strict interpretation of the
Establishment Clause, requiring any public display to be non-religious,
there would be a total absence of religion in the public realm. 3 14 This is a
principle that is actually inconsistent with the Constitution. 3 15 "The goal
of avoiding governmental endorsement [of religion] does not require
eradication of all religious symbols in the public realm . . .. The

Constitution does not oblige [the] government to avoid any public
acknowledgment of religion's role in society." 16 A policy limiting how
people practice their religion is publicly undesirable.3 17 Thus, the
Establishment Clause does not require suppressing the practice of
erecting crosses as roadside memorials.3 18
VI.

PROPOSED TEST FOR EVALUATING CROSSES USED AS ROADSIDE
MEMORIALS

Crosses, erected as roadside memorials, generally do not violate the
Establishment Clause. 31 9 However, there may be a few instances in
310. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987) (citation omitted) (stating that religion must be accommodated in
the public realm in some instances).
311. Id. (citation omitted).
312. Id. (citation omitted); see, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235-36 (1972)
(exempting Amish children from compulsory education past eighth grade because it did not
coincide with their religious views); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970) (allowing
churches to be tax exempt).
313. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,434 (1962).
314. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 893 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
315. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992) (citation omitted).
316. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1818 (2010); see also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,
45-46 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The Establishment Clause does not require that the public
sector be insulated from all things which may have a religious significance or origin.").
317. See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1818.
318. See id.; Lee, 505 U.S. at 598.
319. See generally Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 664 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (stating that crosses do not coerce the public to follow the Christian religion); Am.
Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1157 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding that crosses erected as
roadside memorials have a secular purpose); ANAYA ET AL., supra note 241 (finding a secular
history behind crosses erected as roadside memorials).
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which the message of death is weakened and the message of
endorsement strengthened.320 To ensure that these situations do not
arise, the test that should be applied to roadside memorials would permit
the cross to stand as long as it is erected and maintained by a private
party321 and the government permits any type of religious or
nonreligious displays to be erected as roadside memorials.3 2 2 The
reviewing court should consider these two factors together when
analyzing an Establishment Clause claim. When considered together,
these factors can help determine if a specific cross, erected as a roadside
memorial, conveys a message of endorsement.32 3 The absence of one of
these factors should not invalidate a roadside cross memorial, but the
absence of both factors would tend to strengthen the message of
endorsement, thus creating a violation of the Establishment Clause.
When a private party erects a cross in honor of a deceased loved
one, the potential message of endorsement is minimized.324 The
government is not involved in the creation or maintenance of the cross;
thus, it is not endorsing the Christian religion. 32 5 The government is
merely allowing those who are mourning the loss of a loved one to do so
in the way that will help them best. 32 6 However, if the government were
to take part in the maintenance of the cross, the message perceived could
be that the government cares about the survival of the cross; thus, it is no
longer remaining neutral towards the display.32 7 For this reason, the
source of creation and maintenance of the cross memorial is a factor that
must be considered.
In allowing memorials of any type, religious or nonreligious, the
government remains neutral to all displays that are erected. 328The
government cannot be seen as endorsing only the Christian religion if
other religions are also permitted to erect their own memorials.3 2 9 If it
were true that the government endorses the religion displayed in the
memorial, the government would be seen as supporting all religions,
even nonreligion, when various types of memorials are allowed. 33 0 It
could not be said that the government is establishing a religion if it

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

See, e.g., Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1160, 1162.
See Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 558 P.2d 338, 347 (Or. 1976).
See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763-64 (1995).
See id; Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc., 558 P.2d at 347.
See Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc., 558 P.2d at 347.
See id.
See Harrop,supra note 4.
See Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc., 558 P.2d at 347.
See Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763 (1995).
See Griffin, supra note 291, at 70-71.
See id. at 71.
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supports people of all religions as well as those who choose not to
practice a religion.33 ' As long as private parties may put up memorials
reflecting whatever religious or secular elements they choose, the
government cannot be said to endorse the Christian religion in particular
when a cross is erected as a roadside memorial.332
Considering these factors would be the best approach for a court
analyzing a roadside cross memorial. Crosses, used as roadside
memorials, already have a secular history333 and purpose,334 and do not
coerce the public to practice a specific religion. The issues that arise
with respect to roadside cross memorials are whether the primary
message conveyed is of endorsing religion,3 36 and whether the
government is intertwining itself with religion or remaining neutral.337
The two-factor test suggested here addresses those issues and requires
the removal of the cross only in the rare instance that the government is
truly overly involved in the cross's maintenance or is favoring the
Christian religion over other religions.338
This proposal strikes the best balance because it does not involve
the "reasonable observer," who has the potential of being overly
sensitive or insensitive when observing the cross memorial.
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 34 0
stated that monuments do not usually convey one single message.34 1
There are a variety of messages that could be perceived by different
observers of the cross memorial. 342 The Endorsement test, however,
"depends [upon] the existence of a discernible message."343 The
proposed test does not depend on the existence of one concrete message;
rather, it accepts a variety of messages and finds a violation of the
Establishment Clause only when the two factors are absent. The analysis
331. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
332. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 763-64.
333.

See ANAYA ET AL., supra note 241.

334. See Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1157 (10th Cir. 2010).
335. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 664 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
Dave, supra note 285.
336. See Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1160.
337. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 763-64.
338. See supra notes 321-22 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
340. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
341. See id at 1135; see also Lisa Shaw Roy, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum: Monuments,
Messages and the Next Establishment Clause, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 280, 286 (2010),
http://www.law.northwestem.edu/journals/lawreview/colloquy/2010/5/LRColl2010n5Roy.pdf
(stating that displays do not have one recognizable meaning and can be interpreted differently by
different people).
342. Roy, supranote 341, at 286.
343. Id at 283.
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does not depend on the existence of one concrete message; rather, it
accepts the variety of messages, and finds a violation of the
Establishment Clause only when the two factors are absent. It is only
when these factors are absent that the cross would present a strong
message of endorsement that stands out from any other, additional
message.
Roadside cross memorials aid in the grieving process, and private
parties should be allowed to memorialize their loved ones in the manner
of their choosing. 4 This test strikes a balance between respecting the
grieving process and ensuring the public does not feel that the
government is promoting the Christian religion. By allowing the display
of various religious symbols, the government does not engage in the act
of preferring one religion over another. Instead, by accepting all
symbols, the government conveys acceptance of both religion and
nonreligion alike.345
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has had difficulty articulating when religious
displays should and should not violate the Establishment Clause.346
Despite the confusion and inconsistency surrounding this rule, crosses,
when used as roadside memorials, do not violate the Establishment
Clause.347 These memorials are a public act of mourning; they are not
erected to promote the Christian religion.34 8 Most often, it is the last
place the deceased was alive, and is a place that the family can go to feel
close to the deceased again. 349 By allowing private parties to erect these
memorials, the government does not endorse a specific religion.3 so
Rather, the government aids loved ones in their grieving process.35 ' To
take this outlet for expression away from these families would be a great
injustice. Therefore, crosses, used as roadside memorials, should not
violate the Establishment Clause as long as the cross is erected and

344. See Harrop,supra note 4; Stepzinski, supra note 1.
345. See Dickson, supra note 294.
346. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
347. See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1818 (2010).
348. See Harrop,supra note 4; Stepzinski, supra note 1.
349. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
350. See Dave, supra note 285 (stating that the government does not prefer one religion over
another by allowing crosses to stand as roadside memorials).
351. See Harrop,supra note 4; Stepzinski, supra note 1.
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maintained by a private party and the government permits various types
of religious or nonreligious displays to be erected as a roadside
memorial.3 52
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